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Abstract
Face anti-spoofing is crucial to the security of face recog-
nition systems. Most previous methods formulate face anti-
spoofing as a supervised learning problem to detect various
predefined presentation attacks, which need large scale train-
ing data to cover as many attacks as possible. However, the
trained model is easy to overfit several common attacks and
is still vulnerable to unseen attacks. To overcome this chal-
lenge, the detector should: 1) learn discriminative features
that can generalize to unseen spoofing types from predefined
presentation attacks; 2) quickly adapt to new spoofing types
by learning from both the predefined attacks and a few ex-
amples of the new spoofing types. Therefore, we define face
anti-spoofing as a zero- and few-shot learning problem. In
this paper, we propose a novel Adaptive Inner-update Meta
Face Anti-Spoofing (AIM-FAS) method to tackle this prob-
lem through meta-learning. Specifically, AIM-FAS trains a
meta-learner focusing on the task of detecting unseen spoof-
ing types by learning from predefined living and spoofing
faces and a few examples of new attacks. To assess the pro-
posed approach, we propose several benchmarks for zero-
and few-shot FAS. Experiments show its superior perfor-
mances on the presented benchmarks to existing methods in
existing zero-shot FAS protocols.
1 Introduction
Face recognition is a ubiquitous technology used in indus-
trial applications and commercial products. However, face
recognition system is easy to be fooled by presentation at-
tacks (PAs), such as printed face (print attack), face replay
on digital device (replay attack), face covered by a mask
(3D-mask attack), etc. As a result, face anti-spoofing (FAS)
system, which detects whether the presented face is live or
not, becomes essential to keep the recognition system safe.
Until now, researchers have proposed lots of hand-crafted
feature based (Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016;
Gan et al. 2017; Lucena et al. 2017) and deep-learning
based methods(Lucena et al. 2017; Xu, Li, and Deng 2015;
Shao, Lan, and Yuen 2017) to discriminate spoof faces from
living faces. Most of them train the detector to learn how to
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Figure 1: A zero- and few-shot FAS example. The train set
contains several predefined living and spoofing types. The
test set contains several faces of new emerged living and
spoofing types. Zero-shot FAS is training the detector only
on the train set and testing it on the test set. Whereas, few-
shot FAS utilizes both the train set and a few collected faces
(the blue box) for updating the detector.
discriminate living and spoofing faces with numerous pre-
defined living and spoofing faces in a supervised way.
The detectors are satisfactory at detecting the predefined
PAs due to their data-driven training manner. However,
when deployed in real scenarios, the FAS systems will en-
counter the following practical challenges.
• A variety of application scenarios and unpredictable novel
PAs keep evolving. Data-driven models may give unpre-
dictable results when faced with out-of-distribution liv-
ing examples captured in new application scenarios and
spoofing examples with new PAs.
• When we adapt the anti-spoofing model to new attacks,
existing methods need to collect sufficient samples for
training. However, it is expensive to collect labeled data
for every new attack since the spoofing keeps evolving.
To overcome these challenges, we propose that FAS
should be treated as an open set zero- and few-shot learn-
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ing problem. As shown in Fig.1, Zero-shot learning aims to
learn general discriminative features, which are effective to
detect un-predicted new PAs, from the predefined PAs. Few-
shot learning aims to quickly adapt the anti-spoofing model
to new attacks by learning from both the predefined PAs and
the collected very few examples of the new attack.
Zero-shot FAS problem has been studied in (Liu et al.
2019; Arashloo, Kittler, and Christmas 2017) neglecting
the few-shot scene. As aforementioned, the FAS detec-
tor should solve both zero- and few-shot FAS problems.
To this end, inspired by the model-agnostic meta-learning
(MAML) (Finn, Abbeel, and Levine 2017), we propose a
novel meta-learning based FAS method: Adaptive Inner-
update Meta Face Anti-spoofing (AIM-FAS).
AIM-FAS solves the zero- and few-shot FAS problem by
Fusion Training (FT) a meta-learner on zero- and few-shot
FAS tasks, with Adaptive Inner-Update (AIU) learning rate
strategy. FT means the meta-learner is forced to focus on
simultaneously learning: 1) general discriminative features
to detect unseen PAs from predefined PAs, if no instance
of the new PA has been collected; 2) better discriminative
features to adapt to new PA from both the predefined PAs
and the few instances of the new PA, once a few instances of
the new PA are collected. AIU means the meta-learner inner-
updates with a learn-able regular inner-update step size.
To evaluate the zero- and few-shot FAS, we propose three
benchmarks to assess the FAS model’s learning capability of
detecting new PAs from the same domain, different domains,
and different modals.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formulate
FAS as a zero- and few-shot learning problem.
• To solve zero- and few-shot FAS problem, we propose
a novel meta-learning based approach: Adaptive Inner-
update Meta Face Anti-spoofing (AIM-FAS), which Fu-
sion Trains (FT) a meta-learner on zero- and few-shot
FAS tasks with a novel developed Adaptive Inner-Update
(AIU) strategy.
• We propose three novel zero- and few-shot FAS bench-
marks to validate the efficacy of AIM-FAS.
• Comprehensive experiments are conducted to show that
AIM-FAS achieves state-of-the-art results on zero- and
few-shot anti-spoofing benchmarks.
2 Background
2.1 Face Anti-Spoofing
Traditional FAS methods (de Freitas Pereira et al. 2012;
2013; Ma¨a¨tta¨, Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2011; Patel, Han,
and Jain 2016b; Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2017;
Komulainen, Hadid, and Pietikainen 2013) usually extract
hand-crafted features from the facial images and train a bi-
nary classifier to detect spoofing faces. Recently, deep learn-
ing based FAS methods (Lucena et al. 2017; Nagpal and
Dubey 2018; Li et al. 2016; Patel, Han, and Jain 2016a)
attract more attention. These methods commonly train a
deep network to learn static discrimination between liv-
ing and spoofing faces, with binary classification or depth
regression supervision. Recent researches show that the
depth regression supervised methods (Atoum et al. 2017;
Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu 2018) outperform the binary clas-
sification methods, mainly because they provide the net-
work with more detail information to study the spoofing
cues. However, either traditional or deep learning based ap-
proaches are still sensitive to various conditions, such as il-
lumination, blur pattern, capture camera, and presentation
attack instruments. Slight change of these conditions would
significantly affect the performance of the FAS detector.
2.2 Few-shot and Zero-shot Learning
Few-shot learning (Vinyals et al. 2016; Snell, Swersky, and
Zemel 2017), which aims at learning from very few in-
stances, has attracted lots of attention. Metric learning based
methods are popular to solve few-shot learning problem.
These methods train a non-linear mapping function project-
ing images to an embedding space, and classify the image
with nearest neighbor or linear classifier. Recently, meta-
learning (Bengio et al. 1992; Finn, Abbeel, and Levine 2017;
Nichol, Achiam, and Schulman 2018; Duan et al. 2016;
Mishra et al. 2018; Grant et al. 2018; Qin et al. 2018) based
methods solve few-shot learning by training a meta-learner
on few-shot learning tasks. Given a few examples of new
object categories, these methods train the meta-learner to
recognize the new categories by memorizing (Mishra et al.
2018; Duan et al. 2016) the few examples of the new cat-
egories or updating its weight(Finn, Abbeel, and Levine
2017; Nichol, Achiam, and Schulman 2018; Qin et al. 2018).
Few-shot learning task is usually referred to N -way K-
shot learning task, which contains N unseen categories for
the model to recognize. Compared to conventional classifi-
cation problem, each way in the task has a relatively smaller
number (K) of labeled examples provided for training. In
a nutshell, an N -way K-shot task provides a support set of
NK labeled examples for the model to learn. In evaluation,
a query set that contains several other examples from the N
unseen categories is used to test the model.
Zero-shot learning which aims at to recognize unseen cate-
gory with only description or semantic attributes of the new
category. Similar to metric learning based few-shot learn-
ing, traditional zero-shot learning methods train a model to
learn a visual-semantic embedding (Lampert, Nickisch, and
Harmeling 2009; 2014; Norouzi et al. 2013). Once the em-
bedding is trained, the instance of unseen classes can be clas-
sified in two steps. Firstly, the instance is projected into the
semantic space. Secondly, it is labeled to the class which has
the most similar semantic attributes.
For Zero-shot learning task, the model is required to rec-
ognize unseen categories by learning only from the descrip-
tion or semantic information of these unseen categories. In
other words, the support set of the zero-shot learning task
contains only the description or semantic information of
these unseen categories. In this paper, we prefer to solve both
zero- and few-shot FAS problems simultaneously.
3 Methodology
In this section, we detail the proposed Adaptive Inner-update
Meta Face Anti-spoofing (AIM-FAS) method.
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Figure 2: (a) The fine-grained FAS dataset contains several living (L1, L2, ..., Ll) and spoofing (S1, S2, ..., Ss) categories, and
generates N zero- and few-shot FAS tasks. (b) The meta-learner inner-updates itself on the support set for u steps (the pink
arrow), and updates its weight θ to θ(u). Then we get the meta-learner’s zero- and few-shot learning performance and meta-
learning loss by testing the updated meta-learner on the query set. Finally, we optimize the meta-learner with the meta-learning
loss. The Lj (Q) in query set of the K-shot FAS task means the query set contains Q faces from the Lj living face category.
3.1 Zero- and Few-shot FAS Problem
Zero- and few-shot FAS task We propose that there exist
general discriminative features among predefined PAs and
unpredicted new PAs. In other words, the knowledge in pre-
defined living and spoofing faces can be transferred to detect
new living (e.g. the living faces recorded in new applica-
tion scenarios) and new spoofing types. Therefore, we de-
fine zero- and few-shot FAS task differently from the tradi-
tional zero- and few-shot learning task. In zero-shot FAS,
the model learns the feature to recognize new living and
spoofing categories from predefined living and spoofing cat-
egories. The support set in zero-shot FAS task only contains
predefined living and spoofing faces. In few-shot FAS task,
the model learns the feature to detect new spoofing types not
only from the predefined types but also from a few examples
of new living and spoofing types The support set in few-shot
FAS task contains faces of not only new living and spoofing
types but also predefined types.
Task generation To generate zero- and few-shot FAS
tasks, we split the living and spoofing faces into fine-
grained pattern, and show the fine-grained dataset structure
in Fig.2(a). We show an example of K-shot FAS task in
Fig.2(b), and generate the K-shot (K >= 0) FAS tasks in
the following way: 1) sample one fine-grained living cate-
gory Li and one spoofing category Sm, from the train set.
2) sample M − K faces from each of Li and Sm. 3) re-
sample one fine-grained living category Lj and one spoof-
ing category Sn. Note that, for training tasks, Lj and Sn
are sampled from the train set, and for testing tasks, they
are sampled from the test set. 4) sample K + Q faces from
each of Lj and Sn. 5) build the query set with 2Q faces
from Lj and Sn, and build the support set with the other
2 ∗ (M −K) + 2 ∗K = 2M faces. In other words, Li and
Sm can be seen as the predefined categories, and Lj and Sn
can be seen as the new emerged categories. In this way, we
generate both zero-shot and few-shot learning tasks. When
K = 0 (zero-shot FAS), the meta-learner learns from Li and
Sm, and predict faces from Lj and Sn. When K > 0 (few-
shot FAS), the meta-learner learns from Li, Lj , Sm and Sn,
and predict faces from Lj and Sn.
3.2 AIM-FAS
To tackle the zero- and few-shot FAS problem, we develop
our Adaptive Inner-update Meta Face Anti-Spoofing (AIM-
FAS) with training a meta-learner on zero- and few-shot
FAS training tasks. Furthermore, an Adaptive Inner-Update
(AIU) strategy is presented to improve the performance fur-
ther, as the meta-learner will inner-update more accurately
on the support set with AIU. Specifically, on a given zero- or
few-shot FAS task, one training iteration of the meta-learner
consists of two stages.
Inner-update stage The meta-learner with weight θ
inner-updates itself on the support set for several steps which
can be formulated as:
Ls(τi)(θ(j)i )←
1
‖s(τi)‖
∑
x,y∈s(τi)
l(f
θ
(j)
i
(x), y), (1)
θ
(j+1)
i ← θ(j)i − α · γj · ∇θ(j)i Ls(τi)(θ
(j)
i ), (2)
where τi is a randomly selected zero- or few-shot FAS train-
ing task, and θ(j)i is the meta-learner’s weight after j inner-
update steps. Note that, for each task τi, θ
(0)
i = θ when
j = 0. x and y is a pair of instance and label sampled from
the support set of τi. ‖s(τi)‖ is the number of instances of
the support set. If not otherwise specified, ‖s(τi)‖ = 2M .
f
θ
(j)
i
(x) is the meta-learner’s prediction on instance x, and
Ls(τi)(θ(j)i ) is the meta-learner’s loss on the support set.
Scalar parameter α and γ in Eq.2 are the keys to achieve
AIU. Both of them are trainable. The product of α and γj is
the inner-update learning rate (IULR). j is the meta-learner’s
inner-update step. The IULR changes along with the updates
of j. For example, when the meta-learner inner-updates it-
self on the support set for the first step (j=0), the IULR is α
itself. When the meta-learner inner-updates itself on the sup-
port set for the second step (j=1), the IULR turns to α · γ1.
With trainable α and γ, the meta-learner inner-updates with
an adaptive step size. After u inner-update steps, the meta-
learner update its weight from θ to θ(u)i on the support set
with Eq.1 and Eq.2.
Optimizing stage The meta-learner is evaluated and op-
timized on the query set, which contains faces of unseen liv-
ing and spoofing categories. The optimization can be formu-
lated as:
Lq(τi)(θ(u)i )←
1
‖q(τi)‖
∑
x,y∈q(τi)
l(f
θ
(u)
i
(x), y) (3)
(θ, α, γ)← (θ, α, γ)− β · ∇(θ,α,γ)Lq(τi)(θ(u)i ) (4)
Algorithm 1 AIM-FAS in training stage
input: K-shot (K >= 0) FAS training tasks Ψt, learning
rate β, number of inner-update steps u, initial value of AIU
parameters α and γ.
output: Meta-learner’s weight θ, AIU parameters α and γ.
1 : initialize θ and AIU parameters α and γ.
2 : pre-train the meta-learner on the train set.
3 : while not done do
4 : sample batch tasks τ i ∈ Ψt
5 : for each of τ i do
6 : θ(0)i = θ
7 : for j < u do
8 : Ls(τi)(θ(j)i )← 1‖s(τi)‖
∑
x,y∈s(τi) l(fθ(j)i
(x), y)
9 : θ(j+1)i ← θ(j)i − α · γj · ∇θ(j)i Ls(τi)(θ
(j)
i )
10: Lq(τi)(θ(j+1)i )← 1‖q(τi)‖
∑
x,y∈q(τi)l(fθ(j+1)i
(x), y)
11: j = j + 1
12: end
13: end
14: (θ, α, γ)← (θ, α, γ) - β · ∇(θ,α,γ)
∑
τi
Lq(τi)(θ(u)i )
15: end
where x and y is a pair of instance and label from the query
set of task τi. ‖q(τi)‖ is the number of instances of the query
set. If not otherwise specified, ‖q(τi)‖ is 2Q. Note that when
the meta-learner is evaluated on the query set, its weight is
θ
(u)
i , which is updated from θ with Eq.2 for u inner-update
steps. Further more, in Eq.4, ∇(θ,α,γ)Lq(τi)(θ(u)i ) uses the
meta-learner’s loss on query to compute the gradient of θ,
α and γ, but not θ(u)i . β is the learning rate in the optimiz-
ing stage. By constantly training the meta-learner on lots of
these zero- and few-shot learning tasks, the meta-learner is
forced to learn easy fine-tuning weight θ and propriety α
and γ. With weight θ and the adaptive IULR α·γj , the meta-
learner updates itself accurately on the support set, and learn
the discriminative features to detect unseen spoofing types.
The training process of AIM-FAS is shown in Algo-
rithm 1 and Fig.2(b). We firstly pre-train the meta-learner
to learn the prior knowledge about FAS on the train set (line
2 in Algorithm 1), and secondly meta-train the meta-learner
on zero- and few-shot FAS training tasks. The testing pro-
cess of AIM-FAS is shown in Algorithm 2, in which Pq(τi)
is the meta-learner performance on the query set of τi.Xq(τi)
and Yq(τi) are the faces and labels in the query set of task τi.
Difference between AIM-FAS with the other traditional
FAS methods The difference between AIM-FAS with
the other traditional FAS is that AIM-FAS trains the meta-
learner to focus on learning the discrimination for detecting
new spoofing category, from the support set where contains
predefined living and spoofing faces and a few or none data
of the new living and spoofing categories, while traditional
FAS methods train a detector to learn the discrimination for
detecting predefined spoofing faces.
Fusion Train (FT) Traditionally, meta-learning methods
train meta-learners independently for differentK-shot (K >
Algorithm 2 AIM-FAS in testing stage
input:K-shot FAS testing tasks Ψv , number of inner-update
steps u, Meta-learner’s weight θ, AIU parameters α and γ.
output: Meta-learner’s performance P.
1 : for each of τ i ∈ Ψv do
2 : θ(0)i = θ
3 : for j < u do
4 : Ls(τi)(θ(j)i )← 1‖s(τi)‖
∑
x,y∈s(τi) l(fθ(j)i
(x), y)
5 : θ(j+1)i ← θ(j)i − α · γj · ∇θ(j)i Ls(τi)(θ
(j)
i )
6 : j = j + 1
7 : end
8 : Pq(τi) ← p(fθ(u)i (Xq(τi)), Yq(τi))
9 : end
10: P ← 1‖Ψv‖
∑
τi∈ΨvPq(τi)
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Figure 3: Network structure of AIM-FAS. The pink cube is
the convolution layer, on which the number means the num-
ber of channels of its filter.
0) learning problems. For example, to solve 1-shot learning
problem, they usually train a meta-learner on 1-shot train-
ing tasks, and to solve 5-shot learning problem, they train
another meta-learner on 5-shot training tasks. In contrast,
our goal is training one meta-learner to solve both zero- and
few-shot FAS tasks. So, in AIM-FAS, we train the meta-
learner in a Fusion Training (FT) manner, which means
the meta-learner is simultaneously trained on different K-
shot (K >= 0) FAS tasks. Specifically, the meta-learner is
trained on tasks of both zero- and few-shot FAS tasks, ie. 0-
shot, 1-shot, 2-shot, etc.. In our experiment, we show that FT
improves AIM-FAS on both zero- and few-shot FAS tasks.
Network Depth-supervised FAS methods (Liu, Jourabloo,
and Liu 2018) take advantage of the discrimination between
spoofing and living faces based on 3D shape, and provide
more detailed information for the FAS model to capture
spoofing cues. Motivated by this, AIM-FAS trains the meta-
learner to solve depth regression based zero- and few-shot
FAS tasks. We build a depth regression network for AIM-
FAS and name it as FAS-DR. The structure and detail of
FAS-DR is shown in Fig.3. There are three cascaded blocks
in the network backbone, and all their features are con-
catenated for predicting the facial depth. We formulate the
facial depth prediction process as D˜ = fθ(x), where x ∈
R256×256×3 is the RGB facial image, and D˜ ∈ R32×32×1 is
the predicted facial depth, and θ is the network’s weights.
Contrastive Depth Loss (CDL) (Wang et al. 2018) is uti-
lized to help the meta-leaner to predict vivid facial depth.
The CDL is
Lcontrast =
∑
i
‖kcontrasti · D˜ − kcontrasti ·D‖22, (5)
where D is the generated “ground truth” facial depth label.
kcontrasti is the kernel of CDL, and i ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7}.
4 Zero- and Few-shot FAS Benchmarks
To verify AIM-FAS, we propose three Zero- and Few-shot
FAS benchmarks:OULU-ZF, Cross-ZF and SURF-ZF.
OULU-ZF is a single domain zero- and few-shot FAS
benchmark and is build based on OULU-NPU. In OULU-
NPU, there are 6 image capture devices, 3 kinds of living
faces (living faces captured within 3 different sessions), 2
kinds of print attacks, and 2 kinds of replay attacks. All liv-
ing and spoofing faces are captured with 55 people. We reor-
ganize OULU-NPU into OULU-ZF and show the structure
of OULU-ZF in Tab.1. There is no overlap between the train
(seen categories) and test (unseen categories) set. The train
set contains 2 kinds of living face (living 2 and 3), 1 kind of
print faces and replay faces. All living and spoofing faces in
the train set are captured with device 1,2,4,5 and 6. Whereas,
in the test set, all living faces are the living 1 category.
Cross-ZF is a cross domain zero- and few-shot FAS
benchmark which is more challenging than OULU-ZF. It
contains more varied living and spoofing categories. We
build Cross-ZF based on several public FAS dataset. Tab.1
shows the structure of Cross-ZF. The train set contains 7
kinds of living faces, 4 kinds of printed faces, and 7 kinds
of replayed faces, from three public dataset: CASIA-MFSD,
MSU-MFSD, and SiW. The test set contains living and
spoofing faces from the other three dataset: 3DMAD, Oulu-
NPU, and Replay-Attack. There is no overlap between the
train set and test set, and the test set contains 3D Mask faces,
which are different greatly with printed and replayed faces.
SURF-ZF is a cross modal zero- and few-shot FAS
benchmark. We build SURF-ZF based on the CASIA-SURF
dataset. Structure of SURF-ZF is shown in Tab.3. We extract
several samples from CASIA-SURF, and split these exam-
ples into train, validation, and test set. The train set contains
RGB and Depth modalities, and the test/validation set con-
tains IR and depth modalities. Each set contains all PSAIs
(Living 1;Print1;Cut1-5). Based on SURF-ZF, we can test
the model’s ability of learning fast from new modalities.
5 Experiments
5.1 Experiment Setup
Performance Metrics In our experiments, AIM-FAS is
evaluated by: 1) Attack Presentation Classification Error
Rate (APCER); 2) Bona Fide Presentation Classification
Error Rate (BPCER); 3) ACER (international organiza-
tion for standardization 2016), which evaluates the mean
of APCER and BPCER. 4) Area Under Curve (AUC).
Evaluation Process On all benchmarks, we evaluate the
meta-learner’s zero- and few-shot FAS performance in the
following way: 1) train the meta-learner on the training tasks
generated on the train set; 2) test the meta-learner on zero-
and few-shot FAS testing tasks on the test set; 3) calculate
the meta-learner’s performance with Eq.6.
ACERavg =
∑
ACERTi=1/T,
ACER = ACERavg ± 1.96 ∗ σ/
√
T
(6)
Table 1: Zero- and few-shot FAS benchmark: OULU-ZF.
Set Device Subjects PSAI
Train Phone 1,2,4,5,6 1-20 Living 2,3; Print 1;Replay 1
Val Phone 3 21-35 Living 1-3; Print 1,2; Replay 1,2
Test Phone 1,2,4,5,6 36-55 Living 1; Print 2; Replay 2
Table 2: Zero- and few-shot FAS benchmark: Cross-ZF.
Set Domains PSAI
Train CASIA-MFSD, MSU-MFSD, SiW Living 1-7; Print 1-4; Replay 1-7
Val MSU-USSA Living 1;Print 1-2; Replay 1-6
Test 3DMAD, Oulu-NPU, Replay-Attack Living 1-9; 3D Mask; Print 1-3;Replay 1-4
Table 3: Zero- and few-shot FAS benchmark: SURF-ZF.
Set Modals PSAI
Train RGB;Depth Living 1;Print 1;Cut 1-5
Val IR;Depth Living 1;Print 1;Cut 1-5
Test IR:Depth Living 1;Print 1;Cut 1-5
σ is the standard deviation of ACER on all the test tasks,
and T is the quatity of test tasks.
Implementation Details In our experiment, we gener-
ate the ground-truth depth label of living face with the PR-
Net (Feng et al. 2017), and normalize the generated facial
depth to [0, 1]. To distinguish spoofing face from living face,
we set the ground-truth depth label of spoofing face to all
zero. The generated facial depths are shown in Fig. 4. All
the facial depth maps are resized into 32×32 resolution.
We generate 100,000 training tasks on the train set and
100 (T = 100) testing tasks on the test set. For each K-shot
training task, K is randomly sampled from {0,1,3,5,7,9}.
For testing tasks, K is a specified number indicating the
meta-learner is tested on specified K-shot tasks. For exam-
ple, if we evaluate the meta-learner’s performance on zero-
shot FAS tasks, we set K = 0 and generate 100 such zero-
shot testing tasks to test the meta-learner. We setQ to 15,M
to 10. The meta batch size is set to 8, and the meta-learning
rate β is set to 0.0001. The AIU parameters α and γ are ini-
tialized to 0.001 and 1, respectively.
Compared Methods To validate the performance of
AIM-FAS on zero- and few-shot FAS problem, we compare
AIM-FAS with three FAS detectors Resnet-10, FAS-DR,
and DTN*. The detector FAS-DR is the network of AIM-
FAS trained in traditional supervised learning. As the net-
work of detector FAS-DR is the same as that of AIM-FAS,
We treat detector FAS-DR as the baseline of AIM-FAS. The
detector Resnet-10 is a binary classification FAS model and
is also trained in traditional supervised learning. DTN(Liu
et al. 2019) is a zero-shot FAS detector. We re-implement
DTN with all experiment settings the same to the original
paper and named it as DTN*. For fairly comparison, we set
up the evaluation protocol for all methods, which is shown
in Tab.4. For example, the detector Resnet-10 is trained on
the train set, and to evaluate its 0-shot performance, we eval-
uate it directly on the query set of 0-shot FAS tasks without
finetuning on the support set. To evaluate its 1-shot perfor-
mance, we first finetune it on the support set of the 1-shot
tasks and then evaluate it on the corresponding query set.
Living face
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Figure 4: Generated depth label of living and spoofing faces.
Table 4: Evaluation detail of compared methods and AIM-
FAS.
Method Train 0-shot Test 1- or 5-shot TestFinetune Evaluate Finetune Evaluate
Compared Train set / Query Support Query
AIM-FAS Training tasks Support Query Support Query
5.2 Experiment on Proposed Benchmarks
Corresponding experimental results on the proposed bench-
marks are shown in Tab.5. It can be seen that AIM-FAS
outperforms the other detectors with a clear margin on all
benchmarks. Note that, as original DTN is designed for zero-
shot FAS, we follow the same way to evaluate DTN* on
zero-shot instead of few-shot tasks. Compared with FAS-
DR, the ACER of AIM-FAS decreases by 25%, 17%, and
28% on zero-, 1- and 5-shot tasks on OULU-ZF, respec-
tively, and decreases by 38%, 30%, and 38% on Cross-ZF,
and decreases by 12%, 13%, and 16% on SURF-ZF. Since
AIM-FAS trains the meta-learner to focus on learning dis-
crimination of new spoofing types from predefined faces,
or from predefined faces and a few examples of new living
and spoofing types. It learns more generalized discrimina-
tive features for detecting new attack types. Whereas, FAS-
DR only focus on learning the discrimination to distinguish
predefined spoofing faces from living faces.
Another phenomenon is that the margin between AIM-
FAS and the other methods is more clear on Cross-ZF than
on the other benchmarks. The possible reason behind is
that Cross-ZF contains more diverse fine-grained living and
spoofing categories, which is more suitable than the other
benchmarks for AIM-FAS learning general discrimination
for detecting new attack types.
5.3 Experiment on Existing Dataset
To further evaluate the advantages of AIM-FAS, we test
AIM-FAS on the protocol proposed by (Arashloo, Kittler,
and Christmas 2017). In this protocol, CASIA, Replay-
Attack, and MSU-MFSD are used to evaluate the FAS
model’s zero-shot performance across replay and print at-
tacks. As shown in Tab.6, AIM-FAS performs better than
the other methods on most sub-protocols with rising the
average AUC by at least 0.52%. The result further reveals
that AIM-FAS is successful for not only few-shot but also
zero-shot FAS. AIM-FAS performs not the best on the sub-
protocols of CASIA Video, Replay-Attack Video, and MSU
Printed Photo. The possible reason is that the training spoof-
ing categories of these sub-protocols are unitary and not suit-
able for AIM-FAS learning the discrimination to detect the
Table 5: Experimental result on three proposed benchmarks.
DTN* is our re-implementation of DTN(Liu et al. 2019)
with the same setting as its original paper.
Benchmark Method ACER(%)0-shot 1-shot 5-shot
OULU-ZF
Resnet-10 7.27±1.42 7.13±1.19 4.20±1.12
DTN* 5.83±1.16 / /
FAS-DR 6.60±1.78 4.83±1.40 3.37±1.02
AIM-FAS 4.97±1.29 4.00±1.31 2.44±0.71
Cross-ZF
Resnet-10 26.51±2.59 26.37±2.64 15.43±2.38
DTN* 17.62±3.89 / /
FAS-DR 13.49±3.62 10.54±3.03 7.21±1.87
AIM-FAS 8.43±2.92 7.34±1.45 3.11±1.01
SURF-ZF
Resnet-10 45.60±0.72 45.43±0.81 44.53±1.40
DTN* 45.27±2.29 / /
FAS-DR 34.61±2.15 33.17±2.07 32.50±1.51
AIM-FAS 30.97 ±1.28 28.75 ±1.49 27.27±1.25
testing spoofing category. For example, on CASIA, the Cut
Photo and Warped Photo spoofing categories are not var-
ied enough, and the meta-learner trained on these categories
can hardly summarize and capture the general discrimina-
tion that is effective for detecting the Video category.
5.4 Ablation Study
AIM-FAS for Binary Supervision We validate the ef-
fectiveness of AIM-FAS on binary supervised architecture
by taking Resnet-10 as the backbone, named as AIM-FAS
(Resnet). And Resnet-10 trained in traditional supervised
manner is set as the baseline of AIM-FAS (Resnet). The
comparison of these two methods on Cross-ZF is shown
in Tab.7. Compared with Resnet-10, AIM-FAS (Resnet) de-
crease the ACER by 45.08%, 54.72%, and 41.55% on 0-
shot, 1-shot, and 5-shot tasks, respectively. This demon-
strates the generality of AIM-FAS on different network
structures and different supervision manners.
Effectiveness of Predefined Living and Spoofing Faces in
Support Set Here we verify whether predefined living
and spoofing faces in the support set are useful for AIM-
FAS to learn discrimination to detect the new spoofing cate-
gory. In this experiment, during the testing stage, we gener-
ate K-shot FAS tasks without predefined living and spoof-
ing categories in the support set. In other words, the sup-
port set of K-shot FAS tasks here contains no categories Li
and Sm in Fig.2(b). For K-shot (K > 0) FAS tasks, AIM-
FAS without PreDefined living and spoofing faces (named
as AIM-FAS w/o PD) inner-updates the meta-learner with
only 2K new type of spoofing/living faces, and then test the
meta-learner on the query set. Note that we do not test AIM-
FAS w/o PD on zero-shot FAS tasks since that support set
of zero-shot FAS tasks here is empty. In Tab.7, we can see
that AIM-FAS w/o PD increases the ACER(%) by 11% and
42% on 1-shot and 5-shot FAS, respectively. The worse per-
formance of AIM-FAS w/o PD indicates that the predefined
living and spoofing faces indeed bring benefit for the meta-
learner learning discrimination for detecting new attacks.
Effectiveness of Fusion Training (FT) For the trained
meta-learner to be capable of solving both zero- and few-
shot FAS problems, we present an FT strategy in AIM-FAS
for training the meta-learner simultaneously on all K-shot
Table 6: Performance of AIM-FAS on CASIA, Replay-Attack, and MSU-MFSD. The evaluation metric is AUC(%).
Methods CASIA Replay-Attack MSU OverallVideo Cut Photo Warped Photo Video Digital Photo Printed Photo Printed Photo HR Video Mobile Video
OC-SVM RBF+BSIF 70.7 60.7 95.9 84.3 88.1 73.7 64.8 87.4 74.7 78.7±11.7
SVM RBF+BSIF 91.5 91.7 84.5 99.1 98.2 87.3 47.7 99.5 97.6 88.6±16.3
NN+LBP 94.2 88.4 79.9 99.8 95.2 78.9 50.6 99.9 93.5 86.7±15.6
DTN 90.0 97.3 97.5 99.9 99.9 99.6 81.6 99.9 97.5 95.9±6.2
AIM-FAS(ours) 93.6 99.7 99.1 99.8 99.9 99.8 76.3 99.9 99.1 96.4±7.8
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Figure 5: The learning curve of α, γ and the meta-learner’s
ACER. The left Y-axis is the Y-axis of γ. The right Y-axis is
the Y-axis of α. The X-axis is the training iteration.
Table 7: Ablation experiment on Cross-ZF.
Method ACER (%)0-shot 1-shot 5-shot
Resnet-10 26.51±2.59 26.37±2.64 15.43±2.38
AIM-FAS(Resnet) 14.56±2.63 11.94±1.85 9.02±1.69
AIM-FAS w/o AIU 11.67±2.08 11.53±2.96 6.44±1.57
AIM-FAS w/o FT 12.61±1.67 9.15±1.73 3.25±1.05
AIM-FAS w/o PD / 8.25±1.16 7.66±2.45
AIM-FAS 8.43±2.92 7.34±1.45 3.11±1.01
tasks. To assess FT, we conduct an experiment that trains the
meta-learner without FT. AIM-FAS w/o FT trains a meta-
learner on 0-shot tasks for 0-shot testing, and train another
meta-learner on 1-shot tasks for 1-shot testing, and so on.
Tab.7 shows the performance of AIM-FAS w/o FT. Com-
pared with AIM-FAS w/o FT, the AIM-FAS performs better
on all kinds of shot scenes. The possible reason is that the
FT manner provides the meta-learner diverse K-shot FAS
tasks so that the AIM-FAS meta-learner generalizes better
from training tasks to testing tasks. In other words, with FT,
the testing shot scene is a subset of the training shot scenes.
Impact of Adaptive Inner-Update (AIU) In this experi-
ment, we discard the Adaptive Inner-Update (AIU) from the
complete AIM-FAS. Tab.7 shows the comparison of AIM-
FAS and AIM-FAS w/o AIU. We find that the AIU improves
our AIM-FAS with a large margin. Specifically, AIM-FAS
with AIU apparently decreases ACER(%) more than 3.0 on
0-, 1- and 5-shot. Furthermore, in Fig.5, we show the curves
of α and γ of Eq. 2 during meta-training process. Both α
and γ present a rising tendency, meanwhile the ACER falls
down. This indicates that AIM-FAS prefers a larger inner-
update learning rate, and with the learnedα and γ, AIM-FAS
performs better than the AIM-FAS w/o AIU.
5.5 Visualization and Analysis
In this subsection, the feature (feature of the last but one
layer) distribution of the meta-learner is illustrated in Fig.6.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Visualization of the distribution of living and
spoofing faces in the query set of a 5-shot FAS testing task.
Color used: red=living, blue=spoofing.
We randomly generate a 5-shot FAS testing task and update
the meta-learner for 50 inner-update steps on the support set.
Then the feature distribution of the query set is visualized
with t-SNE(Maaten and Hinton 2008). Fig.6a is the feature
distribution of the query set before the meta-learner updates
itself on the support set. Fig.6b and Fig.6c are the distri-
butions after the meta-learner updates itself for 50 inner-
update steps without and with AIU, respectively. We also
show the category inner distance (L1) and the inter distance
(L2). From left to right, the distinction between the distribu-
tion of living and spoofing faces turns more and more clear,
and L1 declines gradually, whereas L2 rises. The visualiza-
tion clearly reveals that the meta-learner learns the discrim-
ination between new living and spoofing categories on the
support set, and the AIU helps the meta-learner to learn bet-
ter discrimination.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we redefine the face anti-spoofing (FAS) as a
simultaneously zero- and few-shot learning issue. To address
this issue, we develop a novel method Adaptive Inner-update
Meta Face Anti-Spoofing (AIM-FAS) and propose three
zero- and few-shot FAS benchmarks. To validate AIM-FAS,
we conduct experiments on both the proposed benchmarks
and existing zero-shot protocols. All experiments show that
AIM-FAS outperforms existing methods with a clear mar-
gin on both zero- and few-shot FAS. In the future, we will
develop AIM-FAS to more challenging and practical appli-
cation scenes.
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